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Abstract. This paper studies the actions of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) during the 
financial crisis from 2007-2012 rating the performance of the Federal Reserve during the 
crisis. The chosen scoring model approach shows that the average performance of five 
specific measures taken by the FRB only ranks between fair and good. Comparing Stiglitz 
(2010) viewpoints with those of the FRB, this paper analyses several policies and events 
and argues that the resulting decisions were well intentioned but that the outcome was 
different from expectations because of missing regulations and restrictions. Furthermore, 
the structure of the FRB is examined and criticized. 
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1. Introduction 
he subprime crisis that started in 2007 in the United States can be seen as 
the worst financial crisis since World War II (Dullien, et al., 2011). It is 
necessary to understand how it developed and if the responses following the 
outbreak of the crisis were correct. In the first section, the development of bubbles 
and financial crises in general are discussed. In the second section, the 
developments which led to the subprime crises are analysed. In the main part of the 
paper, section three, the responses of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) after 
the outbreak of the crisis until early 2012 are discussed; especially the first wave of 
extraordinary policies by the FRB is analysed. The long-term quantitative easing 
policy and comparisons with other central banks’ policies are not explicitly 
covered in this paper.
1
 The last section concludes. 
 
 
aa† Berlin School of Economics and Law (HWR), Badensche Straße 52, 10825, Berlin, Germany. 
. +49 (0)30 30877-1124 
. Hansjoerg.herr@hwr-berlin.de 
 b Berlin School of Economics and Law (HWR), Badensche Straße 52, 10825 Berlin, Germany. 
 .  
. Sina.ruediger@gmx.de 
ca Berlin School of Economics and Law (HWR), Badensche Straße 52, 10825 Berlin, Germany.   
. +49 (0)30 - 30877 1167  
. Jennifer.pedussel-wu@hwr-berlin.de 
T 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(2), H. Herr, S. Rüdiger, & J.P. Wu, p.192-210. 
193 
193 
2. Asset Bubbles and Asset Price Volatility 
Asset bubbles have shaped the financial landscape for more than 300 years 
(Kindleberger, 1978). Whereas the bubbles during the 17
th
 century were mostly 
driven by excitement over emerging markets, bubbles during the 18
th
 century were 
driven by infrastructure and land improvements.
2
 During the last century, the key 
drivers have been more of a technological and financial nature, i.e., stocks, high 
yield bonds, and real estate (Norman & Thiagarajan, 2009). Although the drivers of 
bubbles have changed over time, most bubbles follow set steps in their lifetime: 
displacement, boom, euphoria, panic, and intervention. Bubbles are potentially 
very costly as their bursting leads to an escalation of non-performing loans, a 
relocation of consumption and investment and the likelihood of long-term 
economic stagnation (Dodig & Herr, 2015).
3
 The burst of bubbles also has social 
effects as people are affected by unemployment, pushed into precarious conditions, 
and see their just gained benefits decreasing yet again. 
Bubbles vary in many different ways however most still have some common 
ingredients. Bubbles are characterized by cumulative feedback mechanisms and are 
combined with unsustainable credit expansion. Feedback mechanisms can have an 
“objective” character (e.g., increasing asset prices increase the value of collateral 
stimulates further credit expansion) or a “subjective” character (for example, 
positive expectations spread to more and more people and become more and more 
positive). The beginning of a bubble, as well as the end, is usually given by 
exogenous factors, however, an expansion phase leads to an increasingly fragile 
situation which sooner or later must come to an end.
4
 
In the recent debate, Sullivan (2009) argues that three factors often represent the 
main ingredients for a bubble: financial innovation, investor emotions, and 
speculative leverage.  Most of the recent bubbles were triggered by innovation in 
either telecommunication, technological, or financial markets combined with the 
overconfidence of investors and leverage. Innovations in financial markets, driven 
by investors seeking to reduce, share, or transfer risk resulted in complex financial 
structures where the risk is difficult to evaluate. This behaviour is further 
stimulated by the desire for even higher returns. Innovations become problematic 
when they fail to deliver what they originally promised and when they multiply 
risk in the system due to assessment difficulties. Usually, regulation is not ahead of 
innovation and thus complex innovations made risk management by investors and 
regulators more challenging. 
In line with the argumentation from Sullivan, Guttmann (2009) claims that two 
main factors are common to recent crises and bubbles: low interest rates and 
financial innovation; furthermore naming speculation as a driving factor for the 
development of asset bubbles.  However, Dellas & Tavlas (2011) argue that the 
creation of asset bubbles is possible in situations of increased monetary liquidity as 
this stimulates the demand for assets.  
Shiller (2005), though, names 12 main reasons that explain stock market booms 
in recent years. These reasons vary from a bubble supported by monetary policy, 
new information technology and the expansion of volume in trade to the decline of 
inflation and the effects of money illusion.  In “The Subprime Solution” (2008), he 
argues that the most important single factor is the social contagion of boom 
thinking, comparing social contagion to an epidemic. If certain factors arise that 
boost an optimistic view of the economy and the removal rate at which people are 
no longer contagious is significantly lower, then the optimistic view will be 
widespread through the market and social contagion will replace individual 
thinking and analysis. This will drive up asset prices and cause an asset price 
bubble. While not the only explanation of how asset bubbles can arise, the loss of 
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individual information analysis to group thinking of decreasing quality is 
significantalthough typical for human behaviour especially in situations of 
uncertainty.  
The number of recent crises underscores that in an environment of deregulated 
financial markets asset bubbles are hard to prevent and sometimes to detect. Even 
if detected, vested interests may prevent a consequent containment of a bubble. The 
International Monetary Fund counted 124 systemic banking crises within the 
period 1970 to 2007 (Laeven & Valencia, 2008). If detecting bubbles would be 
easy, their impact on the economy could have been reduced if not completely 
prevented. Nevertheless, opinions about the detection of asset bubbles are widely 
spread; economists who believe in rational expectations and efficient financial 
markets are blind to financial crises.   
Some economists argue that asset bubble identification prior to the burst is 
impossible. As Alan Greenspan noted in 2002 on the dot-com bubble, “We at the 
Federal Reserve considered a number of issues related to asset bubbles – that is, 
surges in prices of assets to unsustainable levels. As events evolved, we recognized 
that, despite our suspicions, it was very difficult to definitively identify a bubble 
until after the fact – that is, when it’s bursting confirmed its existence” (Greenspan, 
2002).
 
 Other economists propose methods or checklists that should make detection 
possible before bursting. Siegel (2003) proposes that an asset market bubble exists 
if the realized return of an asset is more than two standard deviations away from 
the expected return, taking into account prevailing risk and return conditions. The 
expected return is defined by the duration or the time-weighted average of all 
future expected cash flows of that asset. Siegel argues that this definition makes it 
impossible to judge whether or not there is a bubble as future cash flows are not 
known. 
 Following Minsky (1975; 1992) who assumes that during bubbles leverage 
ratios increase and during busts decrease, Borio & Lowe (2002) propose a pre-
crisis indicator called credit gap that helps identifying bubbles. The credit gap is 
assumed as the “difference between the current ratio of credit to GDP and a slowly 
changing measure of the trend value of this ratio” (Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco, 2009b, no page given). A boom or bust is therefore characterized by the 
event that the ratio of credit to GDP deviates significantly from its trend. The 
critical point of this theory is the decision of which threshold level to use. Borio 
and Lowe’s tests have shown that the accuracy of the prediction is dependent on 
the percentage of threshold used and the chosen time horizon. The best results were 
accomplished by choosing a time horizon of three years and a threshold of four 
percent; 79% of the crises could have been predicted and the percentage of false 
alarms declined to 20%.  
  We believe that a historical discretionary analysis supported by indicators such 
as the one developed by Borio & Lowe (2002) is the best method to detect bubbles. 
Using such an approach it would not have been too difficult to detect a bubble in 
the USA years before it burst. The unsustainability of subprime-credit expansion 
also would have not been too difficult to detect. Administrative tools such as 
curbing credits to the real estate sector, demanding more own capital for real estate 
investments, increasing reserve requirements for real estate credits, limiting 
securitisation of real estate credits or taxing speculative gains could have been used 
to contain the real estate bubble without increasing the interest rate. Greenspan and 
rating agencies, for example, blindly believed in efficient financial markets or did 
not want to stop the party and thus closed their eyes to market developments. 
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3. The Development of the Housing Bubble and its 
Bursting 
3.1. The Housing Bubble 2000 – 2007  
The bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000 led to a significant decrease in the 
stock market. Following strong growth in the late 1990s, tech stock prices fell up to 
75% until October 2002. This led in the US to a recession in March 2001. To fight 
this recession, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the FRB at that time, lowered the 
federal funds rate. When President George W. Bush failed to stimulate the 
economy with tax cuts for the rich, everything was dependent on monetary policy. 
Therefore, the FRB flooded the market with liquidity in the form of cheap money. 
Because of all the excess capacity in the economy, the cheap money did not 
enhance investments in plants and equipment. Instead, consumption goods and real 
estate were the new focus for spending the money at this time. When the United 
States invaded Iraq in 2003, oil prices started to increase. Nonetheless, even higher 
oil prices did not lead to inflationary pressure as wage increases remained low.  
Due to this development, Greenspan kept the interest rates low and money 
remained cheap (Stiglitz, 2010). Global liquidity doubled in size; increasing from 
36 trillion to 72 trillion dollars between 2000 and 2006 (Davidson & Blumberg, 
2008).Thus, Greenspan’s announcement that the federal funds rate remained low 
ruined investment opportunities in Treasury bills and resulted in mortgage-backed 
securities becoming one of the main providers of a stable investment income with 
underlying assets as securities for institutional and other investors. Securitization of 
mortgages has been used since the late 1970s, yet, pooling, slicing and repacking 
mortgage credits only became popular in the early 2000s. The residential 
mortgage-backed securities were structured into three tranches. The senior tranche 
with the lowest interest paid has the lowest risk exposure as investors only would 
suffer losses when non-performing loans would have eaten up completely the other 
tranches. For this reason senior tranches were rated with an AAA.  As a result even 
subprime loans could be sold to a wide range of investors. The riskier tranches 
were sold to hedge funds or other more risk loving investors (e.g., Jacobs, 2009 or 
Hein at al. 2015). Instead of focusing on the design of mature and transparent 
financial products, Wall Street was focusing on products that were generating a 
higher profit in times of cheap money. The main functions of the banking system 
are providing an efficient payment mechanism with facilitating transactions and 
transfers, managing and accessing risks, and making cheap and sufficient loans to 
enterprises. Unfortunately, most financial institutions concentrated on transaction 
costs and earning fees, creating less transparency to allow rent-seeking and other 
ways to make money instead of on their core functions. 
  The income of the poorer half of U.S.-Americans stagnated from the 1980s on, 
and the solution for many was borrowing to finance their consumption. In the 
1990s and 2000s the average savings rate fell to approximately zero. As many rich 
U.S.-Americans increased their savings, this meant that the lower income 
population had a negative savings rate and increased debt enhanced by the low 
interest rates and lax regulation policies. According to Stiglitz (2010), two-thirds to 
three-quarters of total GDP before the bursting of the bubble in 2007 was housing 
related, including the construction of new homes, borrowing against them, and then 
spending the money on something else.  
  As house prices almost doubled from 2000 to 2006, real estate investments 
were considered safe investments. Many house owners speculated on rising prices. 
Expected higher real estate prices and lax regulations reduce the necessary loan 
down payments (Sagemann & Reese, 2011); The necessary criteria for clients to 
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get a mortgage loan decreased and more and more people were allowed to borrow 
money. Risk was put aside as banks thought to sell risky mortgages to the rest of 
the world. The whole system suffered from deep moral hazard problems and even 
fraud. The fierce competition on the asset-backed securities market made 
companies join the wave even though they knew the traded mortgages were bad 
ones. Rating agencies in charge to evaluate risks of asset-backed securities failed to 
act in an appropriate way and intensified the problems. 
When housing prices started to decline in late summer 2006 due to an increase 
in supply and decrease in demand, mortgage rates began to climb. People began 
having problems paying back the higher mortgage rates with their current income 
and borrowers defaulted on their mortgage payments (Shiller, 2008).
5
 The 
defaulted payments caused severe losses for banks and other investors as the 
underlying securities were decreasing in value and therefore did not cover the full 
initial loan sum. Investors thus had to face losses. 
The subprime credit crisis first became public when the Hong Kongand 
Shanghai Banking Corporation Holdings (HSBC) had to announce a write-off of 
11 billion USD in mortgage debt investments. When other investors followed, the 
asset-backed security market collapsed thusbeginning a worldwide turmoil in 
capital markets. Unexpectedly, even money markets between banks broke down as 
banks did not trust each other due to their off-balance sheet activities and the 
resulting lack of transparency. Banks, hedge funds, and other financial institutions 
were forced to recapitalize followed by closed money market funds and the 
collapse of Bear Stearns, at that time the fifth biggest U.S. investment bank, and 
Washington Mutual, the largest U.S. savings and loan association. In 2008, 
Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest U.S. investment bank, went bankrupt, a 
symbol of the largest financial market failure in history. Subsequently, many large 
banks and financial institutions had to ask for financial help fromtheir respective 
governments and central banks and were consequently partially nationalized. 
3.2. Major Reasons that led to this Bubble 
The causes of the U.S.-American subprime crisis and the subsequent global 
financial turmoil are numerous and cannot all be considered in this paper. The 
focus of this section elucidates some major reasons fornot only the creation of the 
bubble but also the developments once the bubble burst in 2007.  
  According to Shiller (2008), the overly optimistic view of the real estate 
market was one major factor during the crisis. In a 2005 survey, a third of all 
questioned homebuyers in the San Francisco area answered with exaggerated price 
expectations. The average expected price increase for the next 10 years was about 
nine percent per year. These expectations were mainly results of increasing house 
prices in the past and their interpretations. As explained in Section 1, the social 
contagion created “new era” stories, making everyone believe in its truth because 
everybody couldn’t be wrong. The price increases supported economic optimism 
which encouraged spending behaviour. The increased spending endorsed economic 
growth and created even more optimism. As real estate prices were steadily 
increasing, people considered housing as a safe investment and started basing their 
decisions on the actions of others instead of on their own assessments. 
  This behaviour was encouraged by what Shiller (2008) calls the “real estate 
myth” - that real estate prices must increase over time as the population and 
economy are growing and the amount of land available is limited. Therefore, 
people expected increasing house prices as a result of fundamental developments. 
Moreover, although the fraction of income spent on housing was stable, the 
increased income wasnot invested in more expensive housing but insteadin an 
increasing amount of housing. To live in bigger houses was the main driver of 
housing demand, not the increasing population. According to the U.S. Census 
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Bureau, the average floor area of one-family houses increased almost 50%, from 
1973 to 2006 while the average household size declined from 3.29 persons in the 
1960s to 2.63 in the 1990s e.g., people moved into bigger houses and spread out 
across more houses thus explaining the increasing amount spent on housing. 
Government programs such as the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) boosted 
housing even more as they encouraged financial institutions to lend to underserved 
communities and to make housing affordable. The privatized, government-
sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac contributed to boosting 
housing consumption as their purpose was to expand the secondary mortgage 
market by securitizing mortgages thus making it possible for lenders to increase 
their mortgage-credit volume. Even more important, in the 2000s more and more 
private institutions entered the mortgage market and securitized especially 
subprime mortgages (Hellwig, 2008). 
  A second factor was the monetary policy of the FRB. Since the prevailing 
view is that low interest rates favour investments and economic development, as 
previously noted, the interest rates of the FRB remained at a low level while it tried 
to fight the economic downturns following the burst of the internet bubble and the 
attacks of 11 September 2001. Alan Greenspan believed that the potential inflation 
coming from low interest rates would be counterbalanced by innovation and 
globalization boosting productivity and competition. Greenspan flooded the US 
economy with cheap money to encourage spending and borrowing in times of 
financial crises.The FRB was mainly focused on preventing a recession and 
deflation after the stock market crash and to trigger growth. Market participants 
were increasingly relying on this behaviour, known as the “Greenspan put” 
(Sagemann & Reese, 2011). Therefore, the FRB approved the loose lending 
policies of banks and other financial institutions because they encouraged 
consumption and were seen as efficient tools to stimulate growth of the US 
economy in a situation of low investment by firms.  
  When house prices rose significantly, Ben Bernanke (in Wessel, 2009), the 
successor of Alan Greenspan, noted that this increase mostly reflected strong 
economic fundamentals. According to the FRB, asset bubbles would not have an 
impact on the long-term development of the economy. Nevertheless, the low 
interest rates implemented by the FRB cannot alone explain the nine-year upward 
trend of real estate prices. Shiller (2008) claims that after the end of the internet 
bubble in the 1990s the period of negative real short-term interest rates after the 
inflation correction was 31 months long. This is just a third of the nineyear price 
increase and is therefore not enough to justify such a sharp bubble.  
  Yet another and the most important factor was the deregulation of the financial 
system. The 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act played an important role. 
Norman & Thiagarajan (2009) claim that after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act 
less than 25% of all credits were given via loans by commercial banks. Less 
regulated non-bank-financial-institutions could offer lower spreads than banks and 
therefore financial transactions were transferred to the shadow-banking system 
with financial institutions which were risk-loving, speculative-oriented and 
followed short-term profit strategies. 
 Financial innovations with no purpose other than circumventing regulations, 
avoiding taxes, and creating less transparency added to the crisis. The deregulation 
made it possible to create complex investment products with increasing risk and 
information asymmetries. The securitization of mortgages and the selling of 
tranches led to complex structures that were hard to assess and judge when it came 
to the actual risk level. The financial markets failed to perform their functions of 
managing risk, allocating capital and mobilizing savings while offering low 
transaction costs. “Instead, they had created risk, misallocated capital, and 
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encouraged excessive indebtedness while imposing high transaction costs.” 
(Stiglitz, 2010, p. 7) Banks and other institutions not only misjudged the risks 
involved in their transactions and the accorded rating of their investments, they 
also misjudged the risk evolving with high leverage. Risky assets only held small 
risk premiums because financial institutions were speculating that either the 
Federal Reserve Bank or the U.S. Treasury Department would bail them out in case 
something happened (which wascorrect). Wrong incentives and opportunities in an 
environment of a deregulated financial system made financial managers greedy.  
  Taking these aspects into account, the 2007 subprime mortgage bubble seems 
to be a textbook example of an asset price bubble as it included all factors of a 
typical bubble mentioned above: Mortgage securitization and other new financial 
products represent innovation. The belief that housing prices would increase 
continuously and the housing myth represent the social contagion theory as well as 
the investors’ emotion approach. When Greenspan kept the federal funds rate at a 
low level, money was cheap and the credit volume was expanding. The increase in 
liquidity stimulated the demand for debt-securities, stocks and real estate instead of 
investments in plants and equipment due to the excess capacity of the economy 
and, compared with financial investment, low expected rates of return. All these 
factors combined with missing regulation and the reckless behaviour of market 
participants fuelled the bubble’s development. The whole financial system had 
become so fragile that problems in a relatively small market segment, the market 
for subprime loans in the USA, led almost to a meltdown of the world financial 
system (Hellwig, 2009).
6
All this shows how deep and fundamental were some 
problems such that the effects of the bursting of the bubble were disastrous. 
 
4. Federal Reserve Bank Reactions during the Subprime 
Crisis  
The objective of the FRB is to “maintain long run growth of monetary and 
credit aggregates, combined with maximum employment, stable prices, and 
moderate long term interest rates” (U.S.Code, § 225A). These three goals implicate 
that the FRB must have an implicit ranking and looks for a compromise between 
the different goals. In times of turmoil, the FRB usually concentrates only on the 
stability of the financial system, which is a fourth implicit goal based on the 
function of a central bank as lender of last resort (Harris, 2008).  
The severity of the financial crisis triggered by the problems in the subprime 
market led to a variety of actions and measures taken by the FRB. As described 
earlier, the main monetary policy tool of central banks is the setting of a target 
federal funds rate to influence the economy accordingly. Figure 1 shows the 
reaction of the FRB before and after the bursting of the housing bubble. After the 
dot.com bubble, the FRB tried to fight a threatening recession in lowering the rate 
progressively to 1-2% hoping to encourage spending and investment. After the 
outbreak of the subprime crisis the FRB acted in a similar way. When the first 
signs of an economic downturn appeared, the FRB Board of Governors began 
lowering the federal funds rate; from mid-2007 - 2009 the interest rate dropped 
from 5.25% to 0 - 0.25%. 
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Interest rate policy was not enough to stabilize the financial system and prevent 
a slowdown of the economy. The asset price deflation in the real estate and stock 
market, the breakdown of the market of asset-backed securities and the money 
market led to severe liquidity and also solvency problems of commercial banks and 
financial institutions in the shadow financial system. A systemic financial crisis 
typical after a strong bubble hit a financial system which had become fragile as the 
result of radical deregulations. The FRB had to take over the function of a lender of 
last resort in a very comprehensive way. Figure 2 gives an overview over the most 
important emergency programs following the bursting of the subprime crisis in 
2007. 
 




The tools used by the FRB comprise the provision of short-term liquidity to 
depository institutions, other financial institutions, and even companies, 
representing the central bank’s role as lender of last resort.  For a brief explanation 
of the various actions taken by the FRB during this period, please consult Box 1. 
 
Box 1. Actions of the FRB 
Provision of short-term liquidity to depository institutions, banks and other financial institutions 
When the spread between LIBOR (London InterBank Offered Rate) and Treasury bills was increasing 
and the commercial paper market between large financial institutions froze at the end of 2007 and 
beginning of 2008, the FRB responded by creating several programs that reallocated funds to those 
institutions most affected by the liquidity crisis: 
  From August 2007, banks were able to borrow from the discount window for a period of up to 90 
days through the Term Discount Window Facility instead of just overnight (Eisenbeis, 2010).  
  In December 2007, the FRB instituted the Term Auction Facility (TAF) to address disruptions in 
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primary dealers, in an attempt to reduce the spread between LIBOR and the FED rates. With a 
lending volume of $450 billion in 2008, this program was used more often than the normal discount 
window with a lending volume of $90 billion (Wessel, 2009). 
  Also in December 2007, the FRB announced dollar swaps with several foreign central banks to 
flood the market with dollar liquidity to provide the dollar markets abroad with sufficient liquidity. 
The dollar swap lines included agreements with countries such as Japan, United Kingdom, Canada, 
Switzerland, Australia, Sweden, Norway and Denmark and the European Central Bank (Federal 
Reserve Bank Governance, 2012).  
  In March 2008, the FRB created the TermSecurities Lending Facility (TSLF), which enabled 
primary dealers to borrow U.S. Treasury securities against their hard-to-sell collaterals. The collateral 
that could be used included  mortgage-backed securities and other assets. To be able to do so, the 
Federal Reserve Board had to invoke section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act for the first time 
during the crisis. The range of assets accepted was broadened when the crisis intensified (Federal 
Reserve Bank Governance, 2012). With this program, the Fed could take up to $200 billion of the 
assets Wall Street could hardly sell and exchange them into treasury securities, trying to prevent an 
uncontrolled downwards price spiral that would have started if dealers were forced to sell these 
illiquid assets (Wessel, 2009). Because the securities were lent out overnight and taken back every 
next morning, the TSLF was off balance sheet and had no influence on the bank reserves in the FRB’s 
balance sheet. Nevertheless, successful bidders could use the provided securities to engage in 
repurchase agreements and gain overnight liquidity (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2009). This 
allocated liquidity to primary dealers (Eisenbeis, 2010). 
  In March 2008 as well, the FRB created the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), a facility that 
provided primary dealers with collateralized cash loans over night, in case the situation with Bear 
Stearns would create a liquidity run to other banks. Primary dealers include banks and security 
broker-dealers (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2012). Cash loans were therefore 
given to investment banks and commercial banks. PDCF was available from March 17, 2008 
following the already implemented tri-party repurchase agreements with the primary dealers. Bear 
Stearns itself was the largest PDCF borrower in the first month (Federal Reserve Bank Governance, 
2012). 
Provision of liquidity to borrowers and investors in key credit markets 
In November 2008, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) was created trying to 
reopen the securitizations market. TALF opened in March 2009, closing in June 2010, and provided 
U.S. companies and individuals access to credit in return for securities as collateral. Before the burst 
of the bubble, many consumer loans such as credit card debt, student loans and auto loans, were 
turned into securities. When the market for these securities froze in the fall of 2008, no securities 
could be sold anymore and consequently consumer loans decreased significantly. As this was 
threatening consumer spending, the FRB was trying to reopen the consumer credit securities market 
again through offering loans to hedge funds and other investors. The Treasury put in $20 billion of tax 
payers’ money from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) that would absorb the first losses 
so that when the FRB put in $180 billion, the total volume of loans that TALF could offer was $200 
billion. Treasury and FRB agreed that borrowers using TALF would not have to pay back the FRB in 
the case where the end consumers behind the securities would not pay back their loans; the borrowing 
institution would then lose the additional collateral posted with the FRB, usually just a minor 
percentage of the total loan (Wessel, 2009). 
  In October 2008, the FRB authorized the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) creating a 
limited liability company CPFF LLC to buy unsecured and asset backed commercial papers from U.S. 
issuers. CPFF tried to reduce the reluctance of issuers to engage in longer-term maturities. The CPFF 
was closed in February 2010 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2011a). 
  In September 2008, the Asset-backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity 
Facility (AMLF) was created to provide liquidity to money market mutual funds. The AMLF 
intended to assist money market funds to be able to meet money market fund redemptions. To make 
sure that the liquidity provided was used in the intended manner, the FRB established redemption 
thresholds for money market mutual funds who were only eligible to AMLF loans if they had 
experienced outflows of at least 5% of net assets in a single day or 10% of net assets within the five 
prior business days (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2011a).   
  The creation of the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) was announced in October 
2008. The aim was to finance the purchase of short-term debt from money market mutual funds. As 
MMIFF expired in October 2009 without having being used, no further explanation for this funding 
facility is necessary (United States Government Accountability Office, 2011). 
Purchase of long-term securities 
The Federal Reserve has expended its traditional set of tools by purchasing longer-term securities. In 
November 2008, the Federal Reserve announced that it would purchase government-sponsored debt 
and mortgage-backed securities. In March 2009, the amounts were increased to up to $200 billion in 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(2), H. Herr, S. Rüdiger, & J.P. Wu, p.192-210. 
201 
201 
government-sponsored debt and $1.23 trillion in mortgage backed securities. The Federal Reserve 
slowed down the purchases in August and completed the whole program in October 2010.  
Support for specific institutions  
When Bear Stearns informed the FRB on 13 March, 2008 that it would have to file for bankruptcy 
the next day without financial help due to an increased run on its liquidity, the FRB decided to 
provide Bear Stearns with a bridge loan in order to gain time for Bear Stearns to find an acquirer who 
would stand behind its assets when markets reopened to circumvent bankruptcy. Criteria were set for 
which assets would be in the Federal Reserve’s portfolio and J.P. Morgan Chase and Co agreed to 
cover the first $1 billion of losses (Wessel, 2009). After several negotiation processes, the special-
purpose vehicle Maiden Lane LLC was created to buy assets from Bear Stearns, consisting of a senior 
loan of $28.82 billion from the FRB of New York and a subordinated loan of $1.15 billion from J.P. 
Morgan Chase and Co (Federal Reserve Bank Governance, 2012).  
  American International Group Inc. (AIG) is an US-American multinational insurance corporation 
that sold among other things insurances against borrowers’ defaulting, especially in Europe. After its 
failure to increase equity to survive, AIG tried to obtain loans. But when AIG’s debt was downgraded 
and its stock price was falling, its business partners stopped trading with AIG and the FRB had to step 
in to rescue AIG from bankruptcy. When the Federal Reserve restructured AIG’s debt in November 
2008 the Treasury purchased preferred stock worth of $40 billion. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve 
created the special purpose vehicles (SPV) Maiden Lane II, replacing the securities borrowing 
facility, and Maiden Lane III to purchase collateralized debt obligations from AIG’s counterparties. In 
September 2010, AIG signed a recapitalization plan with the Treasury, the FRB of New York and the 
trustees of the AIG Credit Facility Trust concerning the repayment of AIG’s obligations. In January 
2011, the recapitalization plan was closed as the revolving credit facility was fully repaid and any 
further lending terminated.  
  At the end of November 2008, the FRB of New York provided Citigroup with a lending 
commitment together with the Treasury and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to prevent 
the institution from failure. The FRB of New York agreed to lend to Citigroup after Citigroup’s losses 
reached a certain value. When the loss sharing agreement was terminated in December 2009, the FRB 
of New York never made a loan to Citigroup under this lending facility. Citigroup subsidiaries used 
other Federal Reserve emergency programs such as TSLF and TAF, using the “ring-fence” assets 
agreed in the loss sharing agreement as collateral. When the agreement was terminated by Citigroup, 
the FRB of New York received a $50 million termination fee.  
  In January 2009, the Federal Reserve announced jointly with the Treasury and the FDIC that they 
will provide assistance to Bank of America to ensure financial stability. Due to the acquisition of 
Merrill Lynch and its holding of mortgage backed securities the Bank of America saw its balance 
sheet threatened. The Treasury and FDIC offered protection against unusual losses from of $118 
billion. In return the Bank of America should have issued preferred shares to both. Furthermore, the 
Treasury announced investments of $20 billion from TARP in exchange for preferred stock with a 
dividend of 8%.  But in May 2009, after the results of the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program, 
the Bank of America announced that it did not want to continue with the announced package of 
support and paid an exit fee to terminate the term sheet with all three parties. The Federal Reserve 
received an exit payment of $57 million (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2011c). 
 
When private lending froze, the FRB extended its lending to all kinds of market 
participants including investment banks, hedge funds and companies. Not only the 
liquidity in the money market was guaranteed by the FRB, it also tried to keep 
other credit markets liquid. The FRB also bought large amounts of toxic paper to 
help clean-up the balance sheets of those financial institutions in difficulty. 
However, the FRB helped financial institutions in need without making any 
important demands to stop the excessive risk taking and management strategies of 
financial institutions which led to the systemic crisis.  
Furthermore, Stiglitz (2010) complained about a lack of transparency 
concerning the actions taken by the FRB, as it was not clear how much of 
taxpayers’ money was put at risk and what the cost would be in the end. Instead of 
increasing transparency as Bernanke originally had planned when he became Fed 
chairman in 2006, the secrecy increased and left spectators wondering if the 
obscured reason was to hide mistakes and other incorrect decisions. There was no 
debate how to handle insolvent institutions especially in the shadow financial 
system. It is not obvious whether a central bank should help financial institutions in 
the shadow financial system and it is even less obvious whether and to which 
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extent owners and big creditors (bondholders) of insolvent institutions should be 
saved. At this point the FRB followed a very unclear strategy which in many cases 
was very much shaped by the interest of Wall Street. In the next section the actions 
of the FRB are evaluated in more detail. 
 
5. An Evaluation of the FRB’s Reaction during the 
Subprime Crisis 
To evaluate selected decisions of the Federal Reserve after the burst of the 
housing bubble starting in 2007, a scoring model approach will be used. The 
scoring model is based on scores for different criteria that are weighted according 
to their importance. Through the weighting, the scores for every criterion will form 
a weighted average that then provides an overall score for a certain project or 
action. The averages of all decisions or actions that have been analysed form the 
overall score. 
To perform this analysis, four different criteria have been chosen. The first 
criterion, effectiveness, considers the reasoning and justification behind the 
decision of the Federal Reserve and analyses if the target outcome was achieved or 
not. It compares the realized effects of an action to the intentions of the Federal 
Reserve and analyses if the effects were helping to stabilize the financial markets 
on a short- and long-term basis. The second aspect, transparency, measures the 
communication approach of the Federal Reserve and if their decisions were made 
transparent to the public and other market participants. Furthermore, it considers 
the aspect of clear guidelines and tools that made the process of choosing a 
particular action understandable. Additionally, the scoring model takes into 
consideration whether there have been other reaction possibilities for the FRB 
(according to their knowledge at the point of time the decision was taken) and if so, 
whether the chosen decision was the best for the general public, although it is 
difficult to decide as the outcome of other actions is hard to predict. The fourth 
criterion analyses the consistency of the FRB’s actions considering measures taken 
before and after that specific situation. If it is a measure that was to be expected 
from previous actions, it is considered to be consistent. If the decision taken 
contradicts other actions then it is considered as inconsistent or fairly consistent.  
Actions or decisions are graded with a scoring system from 1 to 4. Four 
different grade options seem plausible as they deliver enough room for evaluation. 
Furthermore, with an even number of grades, neutral grades are avoided. As the 
decisions involve relatively complex structures which dealt with power limitations 
and were sometimes taken under time pressure, grades of a more diversified and 
outspread scoring system would be hard to justify. The scores are translated into 
the following: 
 1 – bad   
 2 – fair 
 3 – good 
 4 – very good 
This classification allows judging the actions of the FRB accordingly, given that 
bad (1) is the worst grade and very good (4) the best. Fair (2) represents a decision 
that was either justified and following the right intentions but not satisfying in its 
results or involving too much risk on the taxpayers’ side and creating wrong 
incentives for market participants. Good (3) represents a decision that followed the 
right intensions and improved the overall situation but still leaves room for 
improvement.  
As not all criteria are of the same importance, the contribution to the final grade 
for one decision is adjusted through different weights for the different criteria. The 
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effectiveness of an action is considered to be the most important criterion of all. 
That is why its weighting in the final grade is adjusted with a factor of 0.4. The 
remaining 60% of the grade are split between transparency, consistency, and the 
possibility of other actions - each with 20%.Three areas of evaluation are chosen. 
The first area evaluated is the FRB’s interest rate policy (Table 1). The second area 
evaluates measures by the FRB to keep the money market and other credit markets 
liquid (Table 2). The third area evaluates the bail-out of financial institutions by the 
FRB (Table 3).In the end, the average of the scores of the different areas is 
calculated thus grading the overall decision. All areas are weighted equally thereby 
providing a final grade of the Federal Reserve Bank’s decisions and actions.  
 
Table 1. Decision 1 of FRB: Cuts of the Federal Funds Rate 
Comment FRB's comment Score Justification/Explanation weight 
The FRB cut the 
interest rate after the 
outbreak of the crisis 
quickly and 
substantially. The 
time frame in which 
interest rates were 
dropping from over 
5% to almost 0% was 
unusually short. 
Even though the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in times of 
crises is usually hampered, the 
monetary policy actions of the 
Federal Reserve nevertheless 
have worked to improve credit 
markets and reduce the burden 
of debtors. The aggressive funds 
rate cuts brought down interest 
rates (Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco, 2009b). 
4 
Expansionary monetary policy 
in a crisis is like pushing on a 
string. Still, the decision of the 
Federal Reserve to lower the 
interest rate was correct. This 
policy was needed and was 
functional to stabilise the 
financial system and the 
economy. The effect of 
lowering the federal funds rate 
in a financial crisis was not 
sufficient to overcome the 
crisis. But it is still something 
that had to be done.  
0.4 
Decisions were taken 
according to the usual 
procedures.  
The interest rate cuts were a 
decision of the Open Market 
Committee. After meetings, the 
outcome was presented to the 
public. There were at least eight 
meetings per year; additional 
meetings were scheduled 
according to the economic 
situation. 
4 
The federal funds rate is one 
main monetary policy tool of 
the Federal Reserve. The 
strategy is decided and voted 
for in the meetings of the 
Open Market Committee. The 
meeting schedules and 
decisions are accessible for the 
public. No changes were made 
in the procedure in 
comparison to the process 
before the crisis. 
0.2 
There was no 
alternative to cut 
interest rates 
The setting of the federal funds 
rate and the open market 
operations are the main 
monetary policy tools of the 
Federal Reserve. There was no 
alternative.  
4 
As the main policy tool of the 
Federal Reserve, lowering the 
federal funds rate was the 
appropriate reaction. Only 
when these actions did not 
show enough results, the 
Federal Reserve had to follow 
other tools and actions. 
0.2 
The policy was 
consistent with other 
reactions during 
crises periods. 
The lowering of the federal 
funds rate followed the usual 
logic of monetary policy and did 
not contradict other actions. 
4 
Lowering the federal funds 
rate over time to almost zero 
was hoped to stimulate the 
markets and reduce all interest 
rates. This was appropriate 
and consistent with other 
measures taken by the Federal 
Reserve.  
0.2 
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Table 2. Decision 2 of FRB: Measures to keep money market and other credit markets 
liquid 
Comment Fed's comment Score Justification/Explanation weight 
Liquidity measures 
like TAF, TSLF, 
PDCF, TALF, CPFF, 
AMLF, MMIFF, etc. 
These measures provide needed 
liquidity in different segments of 
the credit market. 
3 
These measures can be seen as 
part of the FRB’s function as 
lender of last resort which it 
took over in a comprehensive 
way. The FRB bought also 
large amounts of toxic papers. 
The effectiveness could have 
been increased had the FRB 
demanded financial 
institutions benefitting from 
the programs to change their 
business models including 
securitisation, bonus payments 
and risk evaluation models.  
0.4 
 The FRB was driven 
by the systemic 
financial crises and 
implemented one 
special program after 
the other.  
All information needed was and 
are accessible on the Federal 
Reserve's website. 
3 
Everything is accessible 
except the names of the 
institutions that were bidding 
and those who actually 
received funds through TAF, 
etc. Overall the 
implementation of the 
programs was not fully 
transparent for all market 
participants. 
0.2 
The FRB had no 
option than to take 
over the function of a 
lender of last resort.  
The FRB saw no other option to 
try to keep financial markets 
liquid and to stabilize the 
financial system.  
3 
To provide liquidity and 
policies to keep markets 
functioning was needed. There 
was no alternative. However, 
help could have been given 
under the condition that 
economic behaviour of 
financial institutions and their 
business models have to be 
changed. This would have 
stabilised the financial system 
in the long-run.  
0.2 
To take over the 
function of lender of 
last resort in a 
financial crisis was 




The programs are part of the 
function as lender of last resort,  
3 
The actions were consistent 
with other actions taking into 
account the crisis situation. 
However, there was no 
element included in the 
measures to make the financial 
system more stable in the 
long-run 
0.2 
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Table 3. Decision 3 of FRB: Bailout of financial institutions 
comment FRB's comment Score Justification/Explanation weight 
The FRB massively 
helped the take-
over of Bear 
Stearns; it let 
Lehman Brothers 
fail and saved AIG, 
it bought toxic 
papers from many 
institutions 
The provision of funds to Bear 
Stearns prevented the 
imminent insolvency of the 
company and bought time to 
find a buyer for Bear Stearns. 
AIG had to be saved to 
prevent the meltdown of the 
national and international 
financial system (Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, 
2012). “The actions that the 
Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury have taken to 
stabilize systemically critical 
firms were essential to protect 
the financial system as a 
whole, and, in particular, the 
financial risks inherent in the 
credits extended by the 
Federal Reserve were, in my 
[Ben Bernanke’s] view, 
greatly outweighed by the 
risks that would have been 
faced by the financial system 
and the economy had we not 
stepped in.” (Board of 
Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 2009) 
In the case of Lehman 
Brothers the FRB argued that 
the failure of Lehman Brothers 
was clear for so long and 
markets had enough time to 
prepare and protect 
themselves. The Federal 
Reserve was sure that the 
failure would not pose any 
systemic threat. The FRB also 
argued that there was no clear 
legal framework for resolving 
big financial institutions other 
than banks. Also, according to 
the Federal Reserve, AIG's 
core business (insurance) was 
healthy and could be sold 
whereas nobody was 
interested in Lehman Brothers 
(Wessel, 2009, p.23). 
2 There would have been the 
possibility to let financial 
institutions in the shadow financial 
system fail and to build a ring-
fence around commercial banks 
and pension funds. In the case of 
Bear Sterns and AIG the action of 
the FRB privileged owner and 
creditors (bondholders). Also in 
the case of buying toxic papers 
form other institutions this would 
have been possible. The bailouts 
and the saving of owners and big 
creditors were not helping building 
trust in market principles. 
 
The FRB’s arguments to led 
Lehman Brothers fail and AIG and 
Bear Stearns not were not 
convincing. 
0.4 
There was no 
transparency. 
The FRB argued that there 
was no time to follow a 
procedure following market 
principles. "Things happened 
very quickly and left very 
little time window." (Bernanke 
in Wessel, 2009, 159) 
1 The FRB’s decisions were not 
transparent, e.g., it is unclear why 
AIG was saved and not Lehman 
Brothers. There was no public 
debate how to handle insolvent 
institutions. The interests of Wall 
Streets seemed to have dominated. 
0.2 
Several options 
would have been 
possible. 
The breakdown of Bear 
Stearns might have threatened 
the whole financial system. 
1 There would have been the 
possibility, as mentioned above, to 
let financial institutions in the 
shadow financial system fail and 
save socially important 
commercial banks and pension 
funds. 
In case the decision was taken to 
save institutions there would have 
been the possibility to follow the 
following procedure:  a) 
shareholder cover all losses, b) if 
a) is not sufficient debt-for-equity 
swap for creditors (bondholders, 
0.2 
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but not small deposit holders), if b) 
also is not sufficient together with 
the Treasury the companies could 
have been nationalised. 
Clear procedures and options to 
handle insolvent financial 
institutions were not discussed. 
Options were chosen which were 
in the interest of financial 
institutions and their owners and 
big creditors. 
There was no 




The FRB tried to explain its 
actions (see the arguments 
above). 
1 There was no constancy. Some 
institutions were saved, others not. 
0.2 
 weighted average 1.4   
 
Using the described method, the average grade of all actions analysed is 2.8. 
This evaluates the performance of the FRB only between fair and good. Looking at 
the interest rate policy by the FRB after 2007 there is no criticism justified. Interest 
rates were cut quickly and to almost zero.  The different programs to keep financial 
markets liquid followed the logic of a lender of last resort which has to be followed 
by a central bank. The problem was not an insufficient liquidity creation; the 
problem was that the FRB provided liquidity without demanding a change in the 
functioning of financial markets which created the biggest systemic financial crisis 
after World War II with enormous costs for the real economy and the social 
situation of many people. The FRB also did not demand financial institutions to 
give a certain amount of credit to firms and households or to help poor households 
which were not able to serve their mortgage obligations. Problematic was the 
handling of financial institutions in the shadow financial system and the bailouts by 
the FRB. This policy area was not transparent and not based on market principles 
(Stiglitz, 2010). Bear Stearns and AIG were saved and Lehman Brothers not. 
Owners and big creditors to financial institutions benefited at the cost of risk of tax 
payers.   
One reason for the unsatisfying handling of financial institutions in trouble 
might be the structure of the FRB. In the current election process the directors of 
the FRB are elected by the banking sector. The FRB in its monetary policy, in its 
role to supervise financial institutions and especially in its role of lender of last 
resort can therefore not be seen as truly independent. The question is whether the 
wrong incentives were driving the decision making of the FRB during the crisis. A 
central bank should be willing and able to follow actions even though it might 
implicate smaller profits and bonuses for certain actors or even the breakdown of 
financial institutions with losses for equity holders and big creditors to banks. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper showed that asset bubble theory is an important field in economic 
theory as the effects of such bubbles can be disastrous. Missing regulation and 
reckless behaviour of market participants fuelled the subprime crisis and led to a 
systemic financial crisis. Even though it is important to improve the handling 
methods of a bubble, it is even more important to change the underlying conditions 
so that bubbles cannot arise in the first place. All bubbles have common features 
but are nevertheless unique in their development and especially outcome. Fighting 
the symptoms of a bubble is therefore riskier and less reliable than eliminating or at 
least containing the causes of asset bubbles in general. A major failure of the FRB 
was to not prevent the subprime bubble or at least to lobbyfor stricter regulations 
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which would have been preventative. From this perspective, the FRB was an 
additional part of the problem rather than an institution helping to create and 
sustain a sound financial system. 
  The actions of the FRB after the outbreak of the subprime crisis have provoked 
many discussions. This is not only due to the fact that the FRB created new tools 
that haven’t been used before but also due to the lack of transparency of many 
decisions of the FRB that were criticized earlier. Not only that this lack of 
transparency can destabilise markets even more as market participants act on the 
basis of unclear information, in the case of the subprime crisis the FRB also gave 
the impression that it was trying to hide certain facts from the public (as was the 
case with AIG). This allows the conclusion that the FRB protected the rich and 
super-rich and bailed out Wall Street, not Main Street and poor over-indebted 
households. This impression was supported by the actions of the Obama 
administration which in substance followed the policy of the previous the Bush 
administration (Stiglitz, 2010).  
Furthermore, the rescuing of financial market players during the financial crisis 
sent wrong incentives to the financial market. These incentives have to be changed. 
Banks, and especially financial institutions in the shadow financial system, should 
be allowed to go bankrupt. Institutions should not be too big to fail. If institutions 
have to be saved, owners and big creditors to these institutions should lose their 
investment before the government steps in. Nationalisation of institutions leads to 
the option to privatise nationalised institutions after the end of the crisis without 
losses.  
So while it is important that the engine of the financial markets is running again, 
it is equally important that procedures are changed. Otherwise, a repetition of the 
situation is likely.  Major reasons for the housing bubble and the resulting financial 
crisis were the deregulation of the financial system in the decades before which 
gave room for destabilising financial innovation, moral hazard, risky and 
speculative behaviour. It is within the FRB’s duty to understand, judge, and, if 
necessary, help to regulate financial markets including financial products and 
business models in order to ensure well-functioning financial markets. The recent 
past has shown (as in many cases in the past) that markets do not work efficiently 
without regulation. The fact that the FRB was almost unprepared, and continued to 
deny the existence of a bubble even right before the housing bubble burst, 
introduces the question of whether the FRB is carrying out its mission of oversight 
of the financial market carefully enough. In general, the FRB underestimated the 
risk that banks and institutions in the shadow financial system were holding; 
misjudged the securitization principles and underestimated the incentives for 
excessive risk taking of bankers. The FRB could have pushed for higher down 
payments on houses or higher margin requirements for stock trading, limiting and 
standardizing securitisation and many other regulative policies to cool down the 
bubble before its burst. During his tenure Greenspan allowed banks to engage in 
even riskier lending, for example encouraging homebuyers to take variable 
mortgage loans that could (and did) later explode.  
The 2010 Dodd-Frank reform legislation which includes a soft version of the 
Volcker rule might be a start. Although the question is whether this reform will 
really help dealing with financial meltdowns without risking taxpayer’s money. 
Credit relationships between commercial banks and shadow financial institutions 
are still not cut. In addition, financial products, still need to be checked by 
supervisory institutions before they are allowed to be used. Much remains to be 
done. 
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1 See Herr (2014) for other comparisons. 
2 For further information see Barlevy (2007). 
3 In economic history, there is a long list of economists belonging to different paradigms who have 
analysed bubbles.  Among the most famous are K. Wicksell, F. Hayek, I. Fisher, C. Kindleberger, 
and H. Minsky. For an overview of these paradigms, see Detzer & Herr (2015). 
4 The International Monetary Fund has shown that bubbles usually lead to an output loss after their 
burst. Laeven & Valencia (2008) report that of 40 crises, the average output loss as a share of GDP 
was 20.1%. The impact on emerging markets could be far more important than on developed 
markets. The output loss of Thailand after the systemic banking crisis starting in 1997 was 
measured at 97.7% showing the possible destructive effect of a bursting bubble very clearly. 
5 Between 2006-2009, the S&P/ Case-Shiller Home Price Index showed a drop of 33 % and the 
foreclosure rate consequently went up, tripling to almost 3 million per month in 2008 (Sagemann & 
Reese, 2011). 
6 The savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and the 1990s in the US was quantitatively bigger than the 
subprime crisis.  However, at that time the overall financial system was more stable and the crisis 
could be contained (Hellwig, 2009). 
7 Source: Federal Reserve’s Funds Rate Archive, own graph. 
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